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Abstract
Capsule Networks attempt to represent patterns in
images in a way that preserves hierarchical spatial
relationships. Additionally, research has demon-
strated that these techniques may be robust against
adversarial perturbations. We present an improve-
ment to training capsule networks with added ro-
bustness via non-parametric kernel methods. The
representations learned through the capsule net-
work are used to construct covariance kernels for
Gaussian processes (GPs). We demonstrate that
this approach achieves comparable prediction per-
formance to Capsule Networks while improving
robustness to adversarial perturbations and pro-
viding a meaningful measure of uncertainty that
may aid in the detection of adversarial inputs.
1. Introduction
Neural networks are a powerful computational paradigm
capable of discovering expressive representations of nearly
any modality of data. Representation learning with neural
networks is provided through optimizing multiple layers
of adaptive basis functions. Novel and creative research
has introduced highly specialized functions and network ar-
chitectures applied across a variety of scientific disciplines
and commercial industries. However, traditional neural net-
work models, once trained, are deterministic and prone to
decaying performance as data distributions shift (Heckman,
1979; Sugiyama et al., 2007) or adversarial inputs are in-
troduced (Madry et al., 2017; Szegedy et al., 2013). To
overcome these various weaknesses, researchers have devel-
oped alternative formulations for neural architectures.
One such neural architecture is the Capsule Network (Hin-
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ton et al., 2011). Introduced in 2011, Capsule Networks
(CapsNets) replace the scalar “neurons” with “capsules,”
activity vectors that encapsulate the probability of a visual
entity being present along with information about the en-
tity’s parameters (e.g., pose). Capsules are expected to
provide general viewpoint equivariance across spatial trans-
formations. CapsNets have shown promising results in re-
cent research (Hinton et al., 2018; Kumar, 2018; Sabour
et al., 2017) on simple image classification problems us-
ing a multi-class margin loss. Additionally, these networks
have been shown to have some robustness against adversar-
ial perturbations (Frosst et al., 2018; Hinton et al., 2018).
Yet, Marchisio et al. (2019) demonstrate that robustness
to adversarial perturbations is not guaranteed with existing
architectures.
We aim to improve the robustness of CapsNets by offering
an alternative training approach, making use of a Gaussian
Process (GP) formed through the construction of a covari-
ance kernel from the capsule output. In addition to the new
training approach, the GP classification layer provides a
mechanism for detecting adversarial or otherwise “strange”
inputs to the model through the entropy of the predictive
posterior distribution (Bradshaw et al., 2017). This signal
may possibly be utilized in conjunction with the reconstruc-
tion approach introduced by Frosst et al. (2018) to identify
inputs that the network is uncertain about. Most impor-
tantly, we show that a Kernelized Capsule Network (KCN)
is more robust to adversarial perturbations while also capa-
ble of detecting examples that lie outside it’s learned data
distribution.
2. Background
Capsule Networks Sabour et al. (2017) introduced a dy-
namic routing by agreement approach to building CapsNets.
The hierarchical feature representations are iteratively re-
fined by calculating the agreement between the proposal
and input capsules. The activation is simply the length of
a given capsule and corresponds to the probability that an
entity represented by the capsule is present. The CapsNet
parameters are optimized using a margin loss for each out-
put class. Additionally, a regularization method is applied
via an `2 reconstruction loss to encourage each capsule to
encode parameters of the input image. In our KCN formula-
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tion, we utilize this same reconstruction loss, but provide an
alternative to the margin loss through variational inference.
Deep Kernel Learning Deep Kernel Learning (Wilson
et al., 2016) is an innovative hybrid GP and deep neural
network (DNN) approach that utilizes mini-batch training
to learn the GP kernel for supervised learning tasks such as
image classification. Using a neural network to transform
the high dimensional pixel data to a set of local features,
v = I(x), a Gaussian Processes model is applied to the
set of features via variational learning with inducing points.
There are a number of approaches used to solve sparse GP
models, e.g., kernel interpolation via KISS-GP (Wilson &
Nickisch, 2015). Instead of kernel interpolation techniques,
we take advantage of the variational learning methods intro-
duced in (Titsias, 2009; Hensman et al., 2015).
Adversarial perturbations Given a trained network,
I(· ; θ), an adversarial perturbation to an input, x, is a small
perturbation, η, that causes the perturbed input to be mis-
classified, i.e., I(x + η; θ) 6= I(x; θ). Existing methods
for computing adversarial perturbations (often referred to as
“adversarial attacks”) range from quick approximations that
take only a single gradient step, such as the “fast gradient
sign method” (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014), to solving
the full optimization as in Carlini & Wagner (2017). FGSM
is useful for evaluating a network’s robustness by varying
the perturbation size, , and perturbations are computed as
η =  sign(∇x L(x, y)), where L is the loss function used to
find adversarial examples. For white box attacks, we use
the loss function for our given network, LI(x, y; θ), and for
black box attacks, we use the loss function for a surrogate
model, LI′(x, y; θ).
3. Kernelized Capsule Networks
We introduce the Kernelized Capsule Network (KCN), a
hybrid GP and DNN model that brings together CapsNets
and Deep Kernel Learning (DKL). The intent of combining
the meaningful representations learned through the CapsNet
and the flexible expressivity of GP kernel functions is to
more robustly train the CapsNet via the marginal likelihood
of the kernel function. Beyond robustness, the KCN has
the intrinsic capability of signalling, through the posterior
distribution of the induced GP, when the model is uncertain
and the predictions it provides are not reliable.
A KCN (Figure 1) is built from the nominal CapsNet archi-
tecture (Sabour et al., 2017), with two convolutional input
layers at the head of the primary capsule layer. Intermediate
feature representations from the primary capsules are con-
verted into output capsules, V = {v1, ...vNc |vj ∈ Rk×1},
through the dynamic routing procedure. We treat the set of
output capsules, I(x) = V, as a final feature representation
Figure 1. The Kernelized Capsule Network
that is used to construct a GP kernel function (Section 3.1),
where the correlation of individual features are measured.
This induced GP is then used to infer the probability of the
input image’s label by way of a Softmax likelihood (eqn. 4).
3.1. Variational Learning
The challenge to learning with capsule networks is provid-
ing a meaningful loss when given a vector instead of the
standard logits of neural networks. Given capsules vj ∈ V ,
we want to construct a loss that helps capture the learning
goal of capsule networks (equivariance to spatial transforma-
tion) while accounting for the correlations between features
and providing robustness to adversarial perturbations. To
achieve this goal we utilize Gaussian Processes, namely
Deep Kernel Learning. The input data will be the set of cap-
sules V with the goal of estimating the class probabilities.
To address the scalability of GPs, we use stochastic vari-
ational inference to approximate the matrix inversion and
factorization operations used in calculating the predictive
posterior distribution (Titsias, 2009; Wilson & Nickisch,
2015). First, define the kernel function Kxz = k(X,Z)
where,
k(X,Z) = exp(−γ‖I(X)− I(Z)‖2), (1)
and γ is a free parameter. Then, as shown in Hensman
et al. (2015), the approximate posterior Gaussian Process is
defined by q(f) = N (f |µ,Σ) where the mean is
µ = k(X,Z)k(Z,Z)−1m = KxzK
−1
zz m (2)
and the covariance is
Σ = Kxx −Kxz(K−1zz −KzzSK−1zz )Kzx) (3)
where the m and S are the variational parameters of the
distribution q(u) = N (u|m,S), while Z represents the
learned inducing variables. The parameters are optimized
by maximizing the bound on the marginal log likelihood for
N data points,
log(p(y)) ≥
N∑
n=1
Eq(fn)[log(p(yn|fn)]−KL[q(u)‖p(u)] (4)
This is a summation across the marginal probabilities be-
cause we can factor the likelihood for classification as
p(y|f,X) =
∏
n
p(yn|f(xn)) (5)
For our classification problem we utilize the Softmax likeli-
hood using the categorical distribution.
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3.2. Model Usage
With a fully trained KCN, images are first input to the
CapsNet. The capsule representations, V , are then passed
through the kernel, which via eqt. 2 and eqt. 3 construct a set
of correlated GPs. The latent functions produced by these
GPs are then passed through the marginal log likelihood
(eqt. 4) to estimate the classification probabilities. Finally,
predictions are made by taking the argmax of that output
distribution, with the expectation that the highest probability
corresponds to the correct class of the input image.
3.3. Detection of Adversarial Inputs
Frosst et al. (2018) demonstrated that an auxiliary decoder
network, d(I(x)), could be trained to reconstruct the input
image from the capsule features corresponding to the true
class {vj | j = y} (see Figure 5 in the appendix). This
enables the detection of adversarially perturbed inputs, as
perturbations corrupt the features of the capsule representa-
tion, affecting the `2 accuracy of the reconstruction when
compared to the original input. Bradshaw et al. (2017)
showed that an analogous mechanism could be developed
for a standard deep neural network (DNN) by measuring
the entropy of the posterior predictive distribution trained
through a hybrid GP-DNN. Motivated by these two papers,
we seek to investigate how each signal can contribute to the
detection of adversarial inputs.
To detect adversarial inputs, we assume “normal” network
behavior when the reconstruction error is less than or equal
a given threshold and perturbed images are detected when
the threshold is exceeded. We examine Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curves to understand the detection per-
formance. Similarly, we investigate using a threshold on the
entropy of the network’s predictions to detect adversarial in-
puts. A reported entropy value above the threshold signifies
the network’s uncertainty when faced with inputs that it is
unfamiliar with or have been otherwise corrupted.
4. Experiments
Our primary experimental objective is to demonstrate the
robustness of the KCN in comparison to the CapsNet when
faced with both white and black box FGSM attacks with
varying  ∈ [0, 1]. To isolate the effect that the non-
parametric GP layer has on the performance of the KCN,
we also compare our final architecture (CapsNet founda-
tion + GP classification layer + decoder network) to a
version of KCN that forgoes the auxiliary reconstruction
network, featuring only the GP classification layer. We refer
to this model as KCN-GP.
The model used to develop black box FGSM attacks is a
simple two-layer CNN. Specifics about each model archi-
tecture and the training/testing protocols are included in the
appendix, Section A.
4.1. Datasets
We evaluate each model described above against
MNIST (LeCun et al., 2010), SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011),
and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009). Details about
train/test splits, training augmentation, and other preprocess-
ing are included in Section A. All reported results are from
performance on the test set.
4.2. Detecting Adversarial Perturbations
Figure 2 shows the nominal `2 distances and entropies of
a trained KCN model before and after perturbation (dark
and light shading, respectively;  = 0.3) for the MNIST test
set. The dashed vertical line indicates a notional threshold
drawn to allow a 5% false alarm rate. Histograms for other
datasets and values of epsilon are included in Section C.
Immediately, one can recognize that the perturbed distribu-
tion of `2 is separated from the unperturbed values. Note
that the threshold drawn for the entropy values is near zero,
leaving a long tail of unperturbed inputs that will almost
always mix with the values of perturbed inputs
These two observations preliminarily suggest that entropy
may not be as helpful of an adversarial detection signal
compared with the `2 reconstruction error. We directly
compare the efficacy of each detection method through ROC
curve analysis in the next section.
(a) MNIST-`2 (b) MNIST-Entropy
Figure 2. MNIST test set detection signals. Darker shading cor-
responds to unperturbed test examples while the lighter shading
corresponds to examples perturbed with FGSM ( = 0.3).
5. Results
The results of our experiments are represented across Fig-
ure 3, as well as in Tables 1 and 2 in Section B. For each
dataset, the accuracy of the KCN is very close to–and often
greater than–that of the CapsNet (refer to Table 1), show-
ing that using a marginal log likelihood as a loss function
can effectively train a CapsNet with auxiliary structures (in
this case, the GP classifier and decoder network) without
sacrificing performance. This indicates that the induced
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(a) MNIST-Accuracy (b) SVHN-Accuracy (c) CIFAR10-Accuracy
(d) MNIST-ROC (e) SVHN-ROC (f) CIFAR10-ROC
Figure 3. (a)-(c):Accuracy of the models when facing adversarial perturbations of varying magnitude. (d)-(f):ROC curves for each attack
detection signal. (across all images, the dashed line of the same color corresponds to a black box attack on that model)
kernel function provides a useful mechanism to flexibly
transform the vector quanitity set of capsule outputs to a
Softmax likelihood, rather than relying on hand-tuned loss
functions such as the Hinge or Margin losses used in prior
work (Sabour et al., 2017; Frosst et al., 2018).
Figure 3(a)-(c) demonstrates that the KCN is more robust
than the nominal CapsNet against both white and black box
FGSM attacks (solid and dashed lines, respectively) across
the three datasets presented in this paper. It appears that
the `2 reconstruction error serves as an effective regularizer,
improving robustness against adversarial perturbations, par-
ticularly against black-box attacks (see Figure 4 for example
reconstructions made by the KCN).
When evaluating which detection signal is most salient to
identifying adversarial perturbations, Figure 3(d)-(f) indi-
cates that the `2 reconstruction distance is generally effec-
tive distinguishing between perturbed and nominal inputs.
AUC metrics for each approach are reported in Table 2. Of
note, the `2 detection signal from the KCN is stronger than
that of the CapsNet, evidenced by the higher reported AUCs.
Although the KCN, by virtue of the GP output layer, does
signal that the classifier is uncertain in the presence of ad-
versarially perturbed inputs, entropy alone is not sufficient
to determine when an attack occurs due to the overlap of
the calculated entropy distributions between normal and
perturbed data. The entropy signal could possibly serve as
an early warning of model degradation where the `2 metric
would provide a more dependable signal of whether or not
an input to the model has been corrupted.
Figure 4. Sample reconstructions from each dataset. MNIST cap-
sules appear to look for "strokes", SVHN and CIFAR10, given
limited feature resolution, provide more detail on color and color
gradients. Capsules do appear to have "attention" behavior, e.g.,
the SVHN example, only the 8 is reconstructed.
6. Conclusion
This paper introduces the Kernelized Capsule Network, a
model that leverages the flexibility of non-parametric kernel
functions to extend the rich representations learned through
a CapsNet. We’ve shown that this approach to training a
CapsNet maintains performance, while improving model
robustness as well as the ability to detect adversarially per-
turbed inputs. We are intrigued by the relative simplicity af-
forded to the training of CapsNets through the GP marginal
log likelihood. We believe that hybrid models in the vein of
the KCN, or DKL more generally, provide an exciting av-
Kernelized Capsule Networks
enue for future research in model robustness, interpretability
and compositionality.
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A. Training details
Our models are built using PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017).
Deep Graph Library (Wang et al., 2018) is used to solve
the dynamic routing problem for Capsule Networks. The
probabilistic framework Pyro (Bingham et al., 2018) is
used for Deep Kernel Learning. For training we utilize
the standard train and test sets for each dataset. We trans-
form the datasets by random shifting images by up to 4
pixels and then apply normalization. The normalizing is
calculated using the standard values of mean and standard
deviation for each dataset: MNIST has µ = 0.1307 and
σ = 0.3081, CIFAR10 has µ = (0.5071, 0.4867, 0.4408)
and σ = (0.2675, 0.2565, 0.2761), and SVHN has µ =
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5) and σ = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5). The architecture and
training protocol are outlined below.
A.1. Architecture
The capsule network, I(x), consists of two simple convolu-
tional layers that are unique to each dataset. For MNIST we
use C(1, 12, 4, 2, 3) - C(12, 16, 3, 2, 1) where C(n, k, s, p)
is a convolution layer followed by a rectified linear unit
(ReLU) non-linearity for all but the last layer with param-
eters of n output channels, kernels of size k × k, stride s,
and padding p. The output feature map of these convolu-
tional layers are passed to the Primary Capsule Layer where
there are 8 convolutional capsules, {Ci(16, 32, 8, 2, 0)}8i=1.
Each capsule is then stacked and flatten so that there are
8 capsule vectors followed by the squashing non-linearity
defined in Sabour et al. (2017). Next we compute the output
capsules using the dynamic routing by agreement algorithm
implemented in the Deep Graph Library (Wang et al., 2018).
This produces the output capsules vj ∈ Rk where k = 16
for each class j = 1 . . . Nc where Nc = 10 for each of
the datasets. For SVHN and CFIAR10 the convolutional
layers are C(3, 64, 4, 2, 1) - C(64, 64, 3, 2, 1) with convo-
lutional capsule layers defined by {Ci(64, 32, 8, 2, 0)}8i=1.
See Figure 1.
The reconstruction layer, see Figure 5 is a set of linear layers
of sizes L(kNc, 512)-L(512, 1024)-L(1024, icihiw) where
ic,h,w are the number of image channels and the image
height and width respectively. The first two linear layers are
followed by the ReLU non-linearity.
The GP classification layer utilizes the RBF kernel (Equa-
tion 1) that expects a vector dimension of kNc, the total
number of elements across all capsules. The number of
inducing variables is set to 70 and the output size of the
variational distribution q(u) is set to the number of class
Nc.
Figure 5. Decoder structure used to reconstruct the input from the
Output Capsule layer representation.
A.2. Training Protocol
For each minibatch Pyro (Bingham et al., 2018) provides
the ELBO loss, defined by the function ”Trace Mean Field
ELBO”, for deep kernel learning. In addition to the ELBO
loss, we add the reconstruction loss using a multiplicative
factor of 100 due to the different scales between the losses.
The Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) optimizer is used with a
learning rate of 1e−2 and default PyTorch parameters.
B. Additional KCN Performance
Comparisons
See Table 1 and Table 2 below for performance compar-
isons.
C. Histograms
We present additional histograms of the `2 reconstruction
error and entropy values that can be used to distinguish per-
turbed inputs from nominal, unperturbed inputs. In Figure 6
and Figure 7 we present the histograms of the normal, unper-
turbed inputs and inputs perturbed by FGSM with  = 0.3
for SVHN and CIFAR10 respectively. Figure 8 and Fig-
ure 9 show, for MNIST when using a KCN model, how the
distribution of `2 reconstruciton errors and Entropy values
change as  increases. From these images, it is easier to gain
an intuition into how effective a chosen threshold can be in
detecting adversarially perturbed inputs. For `2 the distribu-
tions separate quite early and completely, making it possible
for an effective choice in threshold to be made. This task
becomes much harder when considering the entropy values
as there is significant overlap of the heavy tails of the nor-
mal, unperturbed distribution. This complicates any choice
of threshold as there will likely be several nominal inputs
that will be incorrectly classified as adversarial.
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Table 1. Summary of Training Results
MNIST SVHN CIFAR10
Accuracy Avg. Ent. Avg. `2 Accuracy Avg. Ent. Avg. `2 Accuracy Avg. Ent. Avg. `2
CapsNet 96.7 – .349 85.0 – .114 74.3 – .455
KCN-GP 99.3 .0062 – 91.4 .059 – 77.7 .068 –
KCN 99.4 .0067 .339 90.6 .033 .220 77.6 .061 .977
Table 2. Summary of Perturbation Detection AUC
MNIST SVHN CIFAR10
White Box Black Box White Box Black Box White Box Black Box
CapsNet (`2) 0.8616 0.8344 0.8907 0.8813 0.8073 0.7992
KCN (`2) 0.9072 0.9160 0.9266 0.9229 0.8915 0.9350
KCN (Entropy) 0.7806 0.7134 0.7953 0.8132 0.7062 0.7843
KCN-GP (Entropy) 0.8860 0.8631 0.5688 0.6758 0.7580 0.6844
(a) SVHN-`2 (b) SVHN-Entropy
Figure 6. SVHN test set detection signals. Darker shading cor-
responds to unperturbed test examples while the lighter shading
corresponds to examples perturbed with FGSM ( = 0.3)
(a) CIFAR10-`2 (b) CIFAR10-Entropy
Figure 7. CIFAR10 test set detection signals. Darker shading
corresponds to unperturbed test examples while the lighter shading
corresponds to examples perturbed with FGSM ( = 0.3).
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Figure 8. MNIST Compilation of `2 Reconstruction Error Histograms for all values of . The two lighter shades correspond to both white
and black box attacks.
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Figure 9. MNIST Compilation of Entropy Histograms for all values of . The two lighter shades correspond to both white and black box
attacks.
